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THE STORY OF BRAZILIAN COMMERCE 
I.  T I M E  A N D  SITUATION 
HEN the Portuguese navigators discovered Brazil, in 
1500 (so the story runs), Portugal was already in her 
third cycle of geographical discoveries; the first had been the 
Azorian cycle in the earlier half of the fifteenth century, the 
second, the South African cycle up to  the Cape of Good Hope 
turning-point, the third was the Brazilian cycle-the starting 
of a new era. Pressed hard by Spain on her eastern bounda- 
ries, Portugal, the balcony of Europe, providentially turned 
t o  the open seas, lured by the Atlantic islands, Azores, 
Madeira, and Cape Verde; Portugal was predestinated to  
find Brazil, but not a t  the proper time nor in the proper situa- 
tion and position. 
Time and situation appear as the two main factors that  
carry the possibilities, the opportunities, the necessities out 
of which history is made. When we say “time,” it is not only 
pure chronology, it is “social time,” the moment or epoch of 
a certain knowledge, advancement, and equipment; by 
situation,” we mean the possible contacts, physical and 
social, the interdependence in human affairs. 
Under these conditions it might be said that  Brazil was 
discovered at  the wrong moment for Portugal, in untimely 
situation and position, for it was out of the way to  India, 
it was too far to  the southwest in the “Tenebrous Sea.” The 
Portuguese of King Manuel were far more interested in Asia, 
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they needed Indian products far more; besides they were not 
in demographic conditions to  start a settlement; yet they 
feared competition in the New World. Thus they were led t o  
postpone “the discovery” as long as possible and therefore 
kept their mysterious knowledge of the Overseas in absolute 
secret; a decree of King Manuel forbade the reproduction on 
historical maps of certain details held as secrets of State. The 
discovery of Cabral in 1500 was just the official discovery, 
when mystery could not be kept any longer without danger 
of being outwitted. 
These facts explain why the occupation of the Terra de 
Santa Cruz, the Land of the Holy Cross, did not thrill the 
Portuguese or modify in any way their commercial activities. 
For some time Brazil was to  be “forgotten.” Yet something 
did interest them in their new possession: the dye-wood, 
called Brazil wood, a tincturing substance imported from the 
Orient and known in Florence since the twelfth century as 
verzino. It was so much more important than anything else 
that  the Christian faith was put aside, says a historian of the 
time, “by diabolic arts that  changed the name of Holy Cross, 
so pious and devout, for the name of a tincture for dyeing 
cloth.” 
It was, however, a great moment in the history of man- 
kind: the Revival of Learning and the Great Discoveries. 
It brought also the compass, the printing press, and a com- 
mercial revolution started by capitalism. Still, Portugal was 
busy elsewhere; if not scientifically, at  least politically un- 
prepared, and not sufficiently equipped for so great a task 
in the New World as the colonization and future exploration 
of Brazil. Tha t  is why the exclusive trade of Brazil wood was 
a t  once leased by the Crown t o  a rich Jewish merchant of 
Lisbon, Don Fernando de Noronha, on fair and profitable 
terms for the Royal Treasury. 
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It was under such unfavorable conditions that the story of 
Brazilian commerce had to  begin. It seemed as if Brazil 
had been allotted by Fate to  the wrong metropolis; that  time 
and situation were working against us. No doubt private 
expeditions were fitted by Portuguese nobles of broader 
views; most of them, however, came t o  grief. The stories 
of Diogo Alvares, the Caramurii, of JOHO Ramalho, and of 
the so-called Bachelor of Cananea are semi-legendary 
episodes that only underline the official indifference of 
Lisbon. 
But the French of Dieppe and Honfleur under King Fran- 
cis, the Spaniards under Charles V of Germany, and the 
English pirates became interested and interfered with the 
Portuguese monopoly, and determined King John I11 to  
start in 1 5 3 1  the real occupation of the country. 
11. COMMERCE U N D E R  T H E  COLONIAL R E G I M E  
Two different phases may be discerned in the colonial 
regime that was enforced in Brazil by the Portuguese metrop- 
olis: one before the Spanish Domination and the other after 
the Restoration, that  is t o  say, after 1640. In  the first 
phase, the main features to  be emphasized are the liberal 
spirit in which monopoly was applied and the real efforts of 
Portugal t o  devote all her care t o  the American Colony, 
spending money, lives, and energy for its sake. During the 
second phase, the Kings of the House of Braganza had 
learned the Spanish lesson, and everything in the Colony 
was to  be sacrificed to  the interests of the mother-country. 
Unfortunately the first phase, 1531-1580, did not last more 
than half a century. Portugal started considering Brazil as a 
settlement colony and not as a mere trade factory like her 
African and Asiatic possessions. 
The kings of the great dynasty of Aviz adopted towards 
The Story of Brazilian Commerce 245 
their colony a wise policy of liberty. Agriculture and indus- 
t ry  were free: a decree of 1591 restricted commerce t o  the 
Portuguese merchants, with the royal approval, but there 
were no vexatious measures, duties were small, taxes moder- 
ate; there was great freedom of movement for individuals. The 
system was well in advance of the general ideas of the time. 
It has been repeated by historians that  the granting of 
captaincies or royal concessions with considerable political 
power to  captains-general or donatarios, was a feudal regime 
applied to  Brazil. Roberto Simonsen, however, has a differ- 
ent point of view: instead of being based on a social class 
division, it was an economic process of exploitation in a 
modern society, with perhaps rather capitalistic features, 
though the hereditary clause of the concession might have 
been misleading. 
Brazil had started her commercial life by sending t o  
Europe dye-wood, Indian slaves, and parrots. After 1520, the 
sugar cycle of her history began, and by the end of the cen- 
tury there were already 120 sugar mills in Brazil. Besides 
the 40,000 tons of sugar of her annual exportation, she used 
t o  send to  Portugal tobacco, and import slaves from Africa. 
By becoming a Spanish colony she provoked the hostility 
of the Dutch. The monopoly system was implanted accord- 
ing t o  its Spanish interpretation of mare clausum and gave 
t o  the Dutch attempts the aspect of a fight for liberty and 
mare liberum. For the year 1649 saw the establishment of 
commercial exclusivism in favor of a private corporation 
chartered in Lisbon, the Companhia de Comrnercio do Brasil, 
which lasted until 1720. 
111. E N G L I S H  TRADE WITH BRAZIL 
Though England never insisted on breaking the monopoly 
rule and having a direct trade with Brazil, for her merchants 
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in Portugal already shared Brazilian trade, the great Portu- 
guese colony soon became one of the chief factors in Anglo- 
Portuguese commercial relations, and its importance can be 
traced by the increasing part Brazil took in the Portuguese 
Empire. 
Before 1580, that  is t o  say, before Spanish annexation, 
there were no special interests for England in Brazil; during 
the domination, the Armada episode transpired. But after 
1640, commercial and political ties secured the predominance 
of England, and from about 1756 onward, Brazil became the 
chief factor in the commercial relations of the two European 
powers. 
Let us have a closer view of the details of those commercial 
exchanges. During the first period of colonial rivalry, t o  
1580, Portugal used to  get sugar from her new colony, after 
having previously brought it from the Indies and Barbary. 
Yet William Hawkins sailed to  Brazil in 1530 apparently 
without arousing the jealousy of Portugal. Tobacco was 
later freely imported from Brazil and smuggled into England; 
raw sugar was obtained in the same way by London sugar 
dealers. Spanish annexation did not affect the growing trade 
with Brazil, though Mendoza advised in 1582 that  English 
ships should be sent t o  the bottom. In 1587, however, fifteen 
ships sailed to  Brazil with woollen goods, glass, and hardware; 
the returns were coarse sugar, molasses, and dye-wood. 
Had not the attention and activities of England been 
drawn t o  their own North American colonies, it might have 
greatly affected the situation of the new Spanish colony 
at  this time. What the English did not attempt seriously- 
for the capture of Silo Vicente was just a temporary aggres- 
sive measure against Spain-the Dutch did, and to  a certain 
extent were successful, for they occupied an important part 
of the northeastern coast up to  1654. 
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BRAZILIAN E X P O R T S  U N D E R  T H E  I M P E R I A L  R E G I M E  
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When political independence was restored, and we re- 
covered our Portuguese nationality, in 1640, there was 
already in Lisbon a large community of English merchants 
who became and long remained the real agents of Brazilian 
trade with England. The powerful company, established in 
Lisbon in 1649, as we saw, soon became the instrument of 
English interests. Difficulties had arisen between the Por- 
tuguese Monarchy and the English Commonwealth, but 
were settled by the Treaty of 1654. English ships sailing 
in the Portuguese fleet were to  pay us more than the ordi- 
nary duties for their goods; English merchants were allowed 
to  trade freely with Brazil in all goods except fish, wine, oil, 
and dye-wood; extra ships for the fleet were to  be hired in 
England. The treaty was undoubtedly a fine deduction from 
the “Navigation Acts” and exhibited, for the first time, 
England’s ascendency over her old ally. 
Wallis Chapman in his book on Commercial Relations of 
England with Portugal shows that  the Anglo-Dutch rivalry 
was still alive in Brazil when the English pledged themselves 
to  protect Portuguese colonies against Holland. I t  was 
already clear that  the important sugar trade through Lisbon 
was the only way for Portugal t o  make returns to  England, 
as the imports t o  Portugal were twice the amount of Portu- 
guese exports t o  England. 
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The Methuen Treaty of 1703 was another step in English 
ascendancy over Portugal. It did not affect us directly, but 
the great increase in Anglo-Portuguese commercial relations 
which followed was chiefly due to  the development of Brazil. 
A few years before, Brazil had entered the gold cycle of 
her economic history. The Peninsular trade of England 
increased rapidly, but the balance was largely made by 
profits from Brazil. On the other hand, the proportion of 
English goods sent t o  Brazil was considerable, and con- 
stituted the bulk of the trade between Portugal and her 
great colony. “It was calculated,” says Wallis Chapman, 
“that on every XIOO worth of goods passing from England 
to  Brazil, 68 were paid t o  the Portuguese government before 
the returns were made to  England, as the imports t o  Portugal 
were twice the amount of Portuguese exports t o  England.” 
References are made by English authors t o  the concession 
by which four English families might reside in Bahia, Pernam- 
buco, and Rio. It was a privilege and a great help for 
merchants, though never fully applied. The English Prot- 
estants were not subject t o  the authority of the Inquisition 
as the Portuguese Jews were at  the time. After the discovery 
of minerals in their colony, the Portuguese grew still more 
jealous. Direct trade was absolutely forbidden; transport of 
bullion was severely punished; the privilege of residence was 
difficult t o  obtain from Portuguese authorities; the mining 
district of Tejuco was forbidden to  foreigners. Negotiations 
were started to  persuade the English merchant t o  give up the 
residence privilege already granted to  him, and force the 
French and the Dutch out of the country in order t o  stop 
the contraband traffic they were carrying on. 
The mines and the plantations of Brazil required workers, 
and the degrading slave traffic between English merchants of 
the African coast and Brazilian landowners went on for years. 
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I n  the middle of the eighteenth century Portugal was 
no longer economically independent, and the Marquis of 
Pombal, the great minister of King Joseph I, described the 
situation in the following words : “The English had conquered 
Portugal without the inconveniences of conquest. I n  1754 
Portugal scarcely produced anything for her own support : 
two-thirds of her necessities were supplied by England; all 
the trade of the country was carried on by her agents. The 
English monopolized even the commerce of Brazil.” The  
English cloth trade appeared t o  him as ruinous to  Portugal 
as the fictitious value of Brazilian gold. 
From 1760 onwards, the new policy of Pombal tries t o  
alter the situation; Brazilian trade becomes more important 
though a decrease is registered in Portuguese commerce 
with England. The development of cotton manufacture in 
England corresponds to  the growing production of cotton in 
Brazil. But the creation by Pombal of two new chartered 
corporations for exclusive trade-the Companhia Geral do 
Par6 e Maranhiio, and the Companhia Geral do Pernambuco 
e Parahyba-prevented the English from controlling Brazil- 
ian trade and limited their share as members of the companies. 
Trade of Portuguese goods was favored, export of bullion 
prohibited; the private trader was left in a poor situation t o  
carry on business with Brazilian merchants. 
At the end of the eighteenth century there was an increas- 
ing demand for Brazilian products, chiefly sugar and cotton; 
the balance of exchange was reversed in favor of Lisbon, 
but as Portugal was growing weaker and more dependent, 
the development of the American colony did not greatly 
improve the situation. The boom of 1791 in Brazilian 
products was due t o  the failure of the French Antilles t o  
supply tropical goods, a consequence of French revolutionary 
affairs at  the time. 
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IV.  THE BRAZILIAN KINGDOM 
The European entanglement in which Portugal was help- 
ing England provoked the Napoleonic invasion and the 
flight of the Portuguese Court t o  Brazil in 1807. 
A great date in the history of Brazilian commerce is 1808: 
soon after landing, King John, then Regent of the Kingdom, 
opened our ports t o  international trade. The monopoly 
system was over, and a Royal decree established also in- 
dustrial liberty, of which Brazil had been deprived since 
1785 in order not t o  compete with Portuguese industry. 
Great Britain derived great benefit from this act, for she 
was the only power with a large commercial merchant fleet. 
The next year import duties were removed for raw material 
and machinery: another advantage for the British. 
Rio de Janeiro, replacing Lisbon politically, became also 
economically the center of the Dual Monarchy. “Portuguese 
trade with India and China,” says Oliveira Lima, “was 
localized in Rio, where re-exportation to  Lisbon and other 
European ports was organized. Exports t o  other parts of 
America were also, for some time, managed in Rio. On ac- 
count of the difficulties that  had arisen in the River Plate, 
all the traffic t o  Buenos Aires and Montevideo passed by 
the Brazilian capital.” 
At that  time commerce with Asia was rather important: 
20 to 40 per cent of the imports of Bahia were from Asia 
and especially China around the Cape of Good Hope. Brazil 
exported cloth, sugar, tobacco, and wines to African colonies. 
Our direct contact with Asia, especially by way of Macao, 
has left many vestiges among us: even today Oriental arti- 
cles, china for instance, are much appreciated. 
But the great event in commercial policy of the Kingdom 
was the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1810. A general tax of 
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24 per cent ad valorem had been the import duty on foreign 
goods. In  1 8 1 0  it was reduced t o  16 per cent for Portugal 
and t o  1 5  per cent only for Great Britain. It was a diplomat- 
ic victory for Lord Strangford, the British minister; Sum- 
ter, the American minister in Rio, who had hoped tha t  the 
new economic liberty granted to  Brazil could be the stepping- 
stone for closer commercial relations with the United States, 
was truly disappointed and explained in a report t o  the 
Department of State in Washington, September 30, 1810,  
the reasons for British pre-eminence in South America. 
The Treaty of 1810, described in its preamble as a “liberal 
system of Commerce, based on reciprocity and mutual 
convenience” was “the most unfair and ruinous that has 
ever been passed between two independent nations,” said 
the Portuguese statesman Palmella. As a matter of fact, 
it proved unsatisfactory to  both sides, for, after all, Great 
Britain was never able to  reap the advantages tha t  were 
granted; on the other hand, Brazilian products similar t o  
colonial British products were barred on the British market. 
V. IMPERIAL PHASE:  A N  EVOLUTION 
Independence did not modify very considerably the 
economic status of the country; but the restoration of peace 
in Europe had determined other powerful nations of the 
Continent t o  obtain from the newly-recognized Imperial 
Government some of the privileges that  had been granted to  
Great Britain. 
One of Britain’s competitors was France, which in 1816 
had sent an agent, Luxembourg, t o  Rio, t o  negotiate a 
commercial treaty. Ten years later, in 1826, the first 
agreement was signed with her. French goods were much in 
favor, though freights were high, and as tropical Brazilian 
products were not admitted in competition with those of 
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French colonies, sailing ships to  France were loaded with the 
best Brazilian woods as ballast. 
The French treaty was the first of a series of commercial 
agreements with the different European countries, the 
United States, and the River Plate Republics, 1826-1828. 
It was a sort of standardization of our trading regime, and 
its economic conditions proved satisfactory for about eighty 
years. It was only in 1907 that  we started remodelling our 
commercial understandings. 
The evolution of commerce during the Empire is illus- 
trated mostly by successive tariff reforms. Brazil instituted 
her first tariff in 1828, under the initiative of Bernard0 de 
Vasconcellos. Rates were made uniform, with a duty of 
1 5  per cent for all; monopolies were suppressed, commercial 
liberty was established. It was a kind of free-trade regime 
under liberal principles that  were still unknown on the 
European Continent. 
But that  free-trade experiment did not last more than 
sixteen years. Protectionism was enforced in 1844, though 
the tariff of Alves Branco of that  year imposed duties of 
only 3 0  per cent. Two purposes as usual were then in view: 
financial help to  the State and economic protection for 
industry. 
It would take too long t o  describe the plans intended to 
be carried out by the half-dozen tariff reforms that followed 
1844. There is no doubt that  besides the considerations of 
revenue, the steady and progressive evolution towards 
protectionism, culminating in the I 887 tariff, encouraged 
the establishment of industries. 
In  the first decade of the Empire, importations exceeded 
exportations. During the fifties there were oscillations in 
the balance, but from 1861 onwards exports rose above 
imports with a few annual exceptions. 
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On the whole, there was a general increase in Brazilian 
commerce. Compared t o  the period 1833-1843, the ten year 
period 1883-1893 shows foreign commerce increased in 
value to  600 per cent. 
During these sixty years under consideration, the sources 
of imports were Great Britain, France, the United States, 
and Portugal. After 1862, there was a relative decline in 
North American imports in Brazil. On the other hand, the 
countries of destination of exports were, during the same 
period, Great Britain, the United States, France, and 
Germany. 
The  chief exports were coffee, sugar, cotton, hides, and 
rubber. In  the early seventies, cotton took second place 
from sugar. This was due to  the accidental circumstance 
of a temporary substitution of Brazilian cotton for American 
cotton during the Civil War between the States. 
Each of these products would have an interesting story 
t o  tell. Let us consider, however, only coffee, the leading 
article of Brazilian export for over a century. Coffee had 
been an agricultural product of the country a hundred years 
before it had been exported, for it had been brought t o  Brazil 
in 1727, and from I770 was cultivated in the gardens and 
orchards of Rio de Janeiro. In  those days the markets of the 
world were supplied by Asia, Africa, Java, and the Antilles. 
U’ith the development of the province of Rio de Janeiro, 
exports from its plantations began in the eighteen-twenties. 
By 1826 Brazilian coffee was already 20 per cent of the 
world’s supply. In the fifties, the share was broadened t o  
40 per cent; the Parahyba Valley was then a t  the height of 
its prosperity. At the end of the Empire, Brazilian coffee 
reached 50 per cent of the total; but the adaptation of the 
paulista plateau with its red soil, the terra roxa, and the 
building of the port of Santos led Brazilian coffee t o  the 
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golden phase of its history with 80 per cent of the world’s 
production. 
The  last period, “the fifth period,” as Roberto Simonsen 
puts i t ,  started in 1897 with accelerated but uncoordinated 
culture in paulista districts, causing the over-production 
from which we are still suffering, with all its economic, social, 
and political consequences. 
During that  period of sixty years, among the incidents 
of interest in our commercial policy was intervention in the 
River Plate markets, an economic consequence of a political 
episode. As the imperial government had decided t o  inter- 
fere in Buenos Aires and Montevideo against the dictator 
Rosas and Oribe, his Uruguayan lieutenant, the Baron de 
Maui ,  an important Brazilian capitalist, was entrusted 
with the financial part of the contract with Uruguayan 
liberals. Accordingly he became interested in the economic 
equipment and development of Montevideo and the Uru- 
guayan trade between 1850 and 1868. This was considered 
a short episode of Brazilian economic imperialism in the 
River Plate Republic. 
Curiously enough, liberal ideas had led Brazil to  interfere 
in the South and claim the liberty of access t o  her interior 
province of hlat to  Grosso by way of the River Plate and 
the Paraguay. Conservative ideas, however, led that  same 
imperial government t o  postpone any discussion of the free 
access of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia by the Amazon River. 
Commander Mathew Maury, the well-known hydrographer 
and explorer, who died in Lexington, Virginia, in 1873, had 
written twenty years before his Letterr on the Amazon in 
which he disclosed t o  the world the situation of commerce 
and navigation in that  part of the Brazilian Empire. Under 
the pressure of world opinion and of American diplomacy, 
the imperial government opened the Amazon to  international 
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traffic in 1867. And once more appears in our commercial 
history the name of Baron de Mau i ,  who generously gave 
up the privileges he held by contract for the exclusive 
navigation of the Amazon. 
VI .  COMMERCIAL D E V E L O P M E N T :  PREWAR-AFTER W A R  
It must be admitted that  under the Republican regime, 
from 1889 onwards, the commercial progress of Brazil, 
aided by a number of favorable factors and circumstances, 
was considerably more rapid than before: in ten years the in- 
crease was comparable to  that of the previous period of 
thirty years. 
Annual Aoeragt  Figures 
Years Exports Imports 
1861-70 14.9 13.1 
1871-80 19.9 16.4 
1881-90 22.0 19.2 
29. I 25.2 
I Empire 
[I 89 I -I  900 
1901-10 47.6 31.8 
191 1-20 68.8 54.6 
Republic 
[ I  92 1-30 80.5 67.4 
(in million pounds sterling) 
In  the twentieth century, however, progress has been still 
more conspicuous; but figures ought t o  be given in pounds 
sterling, otherwise, if stated in national currency, the de- 
preciation of the milreis distorts the economic phenomenon, 
giving the increase still larger proportions. 
One of the most characteristic features of our foreign trade, 
after the establishment of the Republic, was the consider- 
able advance of the United States as a country of origin of 
our imports, and chiefly as the country of destination of our 
exports. There was of course, in prewar times, a rapid in- 
256 Lectures on Brazilian Affairs 
crease of German trade on the Brazilian market, but com- 
merce turned more and more t o  America. This was due t o  the 
fact that  Brazilian trade was in coffee and raw materials that  
were needed in the United States and admitted free. 
Brazil afforded preferential rates t o  a number of American 
products. By a reciprocity agreement of 1891 certain articles 
of American origin were imported free into Brazil and others 
were granted a reduction of 25 per cent of the ordinary duty. 
After some years the preferential treatment of American 
imports was discontinued, but in 1904 it was renewed in 
favor of certain goods such as wheat, flour, India rubber, 
inks, colors, matches, etc. The idea was t o  keep up on the 
American market compensation for coffee.' 
Brazil was very much affected by the Great War, not only 
because her chief purchasers were involved in the conflict 
and had t o  alter the nature of their trade, but also on account 
of the lack of shipping. Germany was lost for a time as a 
customer. On the other hand, the different imports and ex- 
ports were affected in several ways. Many supplies were 
curtailed, such as coal, gasoline, iron, and codfish. Exports, 
especially coffee, declined, though rubber and hides con- 
sistently retained their importance. A special stimulus was 
given to  manganese. Brazil became rapidly an exporter of 
staple food crops. Though artificial, that  result showed that  
Brazil was self-suficient, and could easily enter the world 
market as an exporter of foodstuffs. 
After the war there was a boom in 1919-1920 and a cor- 
responding increase in both exports and imports. In  1920 
the balance of trade was clearly unfavorable to  Brazil: the 
buying t o  replenish exhausted stocks made imports much 
higher, and the currency suffered a first depreciation, though 
'Frank R. Rutter,  Tariff Systtms of South American Countrier (Department of 
Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1916). 
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in France and in England the Brazilian milreis appeared 
normal. 
But the most interesting feature in Brazilian postwar 
commerce was the new classification of countries that  shared 
her foreign trade. The United States became pre-eminent 
with imports into Brazil two and three times larger than 
those of Britain, and strengthened her position as purchaser 
of Brazilian exports a t  a rate of about three times those of 
France, the second customer. 
After the boom, in 1921, there was a sudden drop and com- 
parison with prewar conditions became unfavorable; and 
1922 brought t o  Brazil a financial crisis from which recovery 
was slow. The  years preceding 1930 witnessed a redistribu- 
tion of origins and destinations. Great Britain recovered her 
prewar position in Brazilian imports. Germany joined again 
in the competition as buyer and seller; but the Argentine 
kept her newly-conquered position. 
VII. THE N E W  TRADE CONDITIONS I N  BRAZIL 
I n  order t o  understand the present position of the United 
States in connection with the Brazilian market we shall have 
t o  summarize the recent changes that  have occurred in 
Brazilian economy. 
After the crisis which affected the country in the twenties, 
the government took certain emergency measures tha t  in- 
fluenced the commercial situation and trade relations. Four 
aspects a t  least must be examined: 
I .  The  currency question, in which fluctuations in ex- 
change, following the depreciation of the milreis, and specu- 
lative factors, were changing trade conditions. As our gold 
reserves had been exhausted without preventing the decline 
of our money, the government decreed the creation of an 
Exchange Control Office through which all exchange trans- 
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actions had t o  pass. All foreign exchange had by law t o  be 
sold t o  this Office a t  closely fixed rates. Restrictions began 
t o  be relaxed in 1934-1935, and an open market was restored. 
But as a substantial backlog of commercial credit was ac- 
cumulated or “frozen,” some financial agreements had t o  be 
arranged with certain countries, including the United States. 
The result was tha t  in many countries cash was demanded 
as long as control remained in force over remittances. 
2. A revision of tariffs was found necessary t o  increase the 
government’s revenues and to  readjust the duties affected 
by the fluctuating values of the milreis in relation t o  gold. 
The  new tariff was increased in 1934. The plan was carried 
out in order t o  grant additional protection t o  home indus- 
try, which, by the higher cost of imported goods, felt already 
some security. 
3. The  diversification of production, as the over-produc- 
tion of a few crops, constitutes a danger in foreign trade. On 
the other hand, improved production methods, marketing by 
classification, standardization, and better distribution were 
recognized as urgently needed measures for Brazilian exports. 
The government interfered to  restrict new plantations of 
coffee and destroy surplus crops; the cocoa industry was 
given an intelligent direction by the establishment of an 
institute t o  assure uniform classification, reduced cost of 
transportation, warehousing, and marketing. A Sugar and 
Alcohol Institute functioned in a similar manner for sugar, 
and corresponding institutes for mat;, meat, and rice have 
been created with the same object in view. The  result was an 
increasing diversity of better-equipped sources of produc- 
tion. Cotton and fruits were the first great exports of t ha t  
new policy. 
4. Commercial agreements started in 1936-the indus- 
trial acknowledgment of our new economy. I n  some 
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countries the autarchy policy or national sufficiency has 
determined quotas for products imported from foreign 
sources. Brazil had t o  negotiate larger quotas for her 
products in return for concessions. The willingness to  grant 
larger quotas t o  Brazil was helped by the desire t o  release 
credits blocked in Brazil and also by the fact that  Brazilian 
output is chiefly of raw materials and foodstuffs. 
5 .  Greater credit facilities, by extension of the rediscount 
and providing a broader field for internal securities, were 
other government initiatives that improved considerably the 
purchasing power of the country. Coal, iron, and cement 
were among the first privileged mining activities; but manu- 
facturing increased also rapidly, thus influencing the inter- 
nal market for foreign goods. For coffee production results 
were still more dramatic. It is said that large estates passed, 
in Sao Paulo, from 50 per cent of the cultivated land to  IO 
per cent only; it is “ the transition from the large absentee 
ownership to  small operating farmers,” as Ralph H. Aker- 
man, commercial attach&, states in his report of 1937. 
The Brazilian commercial depression began in 1926; re- 
covery started in 1935. If we examine exports in tons, we 
might follow the movement from 1,622,000 tons in 1932 t o  
3,933,000 tons in 1938. Values expressed in contos de reis 
also increase but values in dollars, owing to  exchange condi- 
tions, show a decrease when compared with figures of 1926, 
for instance. 
As consequences of these facts, we may mention: an in- 
creasing industrialization in the southern states, Sao Paulo, 
for example; a rapid progress in the self-supporting system 
of the country; the abandonment of a single crop economy 
and policy; and a resultant new economy that  may alter the 
international trade relations of the country. Yet key in- 
dustries are still missing. 
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VIII .  T H E  A M E R I C A N  C O N T R I B U T I O N  
The most interesting part of the dislocation of the world 
market can be traced to  the contribution of the United 
States. Since coffee had reached paramount importance 
among Brazilian exports, the United States became a pur- 
chaser of this product on a large scale. A Brazilian writer, 
Nelson Sodri, has recently said : 
T h e  history of Brazilian commerce might be described in three decisive 
stages: the Lusitanian, the English, and the American. T h e  first pre- 
dominates in colonial times and during the Kingdom. The  second involves 
the Empire down to 1870. T h e  third starts in 1870 and comes down t o  us. 
Each one of them is marked by the pre-eminence of trade transactions, 
with Portugal, with England, and with the United States. To emphasize 
the importance of the pre-eminence in political and social events of the 
country, i t  is sufficient to  s tudy the period in which each of them pre- 
dominates. The  colonial institutions were essentially Portuguese. T h e  
imperial ones had living features marked with British (an experiment in 
parliamentary regime). With the cropping of democratic and liberal 
ideas a t  the end of the Empire, the increasing importance of the United 
States of America is revealed by their larger share in Brazilian Commerce. 
The  transaction regime thus leads t o  imports of political ideas and state 
institutions. 
As a general statement this may be a half-truth, but in the 
present case it does certainly explain also many non-com- 
mercial features of Brazilian social life in evolution. 
Great Britain, France, Germany, Argentina, and Belgium 
are the most important purchasers and suppliers of Brazil. 
Yet until recently, 1934, the United States was the unchal- 
lenged leading supplier of Brazilian requirements. This 
position of pre-eminence emerged during the war and lasted 
over fifteen years. But in 1934, Germany started improving 
her position substantially, and overtook Great Britain in 
1935. Two years later, in 1937, she succeeded in overtaking 
the United States as well. From 5 1  million pounds sterling 
sold to  Brazil in 1920, American exports declined to  6,400,000 
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in 1935. Happily the Brazilian exports t o  the United States 
did not suffer so much, yet they fell from 44 in 1920 to  13 
in 1935. 
In Millions Sterling 
Brazilian Imports from 
United States Germany Great Britain 
1920 51.9 5.8 27.1 
I925 20.7 11.7 18.7 
I930 I 2.9 6. I 10.4 
I93 5 6.4 5.6 3.4 
I937 9.3 9.6 4.9 
I 920 44.9 6. I 8.7 
I925 46.4 6.8 5.1 
I930 26.5 5.9 5.4 
I93 5 13.0 5.4 3.0 
























Certain commercial reports might be examined with inter- 
est in order to understand the present situation, and fore- 
cast future developments. 
I.  Agricultural equipment and machinery constitute a 
group of American imports greatly needed by Brazil, though 
tropical agriculture is still very unsatisfactorily equipped, 
plows, tractors, incubators, seeders, etc. This is not only be- 
cause rudimentary methods prevail frequently, but also be- 
cause the small farmer as a rule has very limited buying 
power. The lower-priced German equipment has thus 
reached the more modest farmer and supplanted American 
merchandise in many cases. On the other hand, the recent 
expansion of cotton culture has been beneficial t o  American 
ginning and baling machinery. As Brazil suffers from a 
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shortage of rural labor, it is probable that labor-saving de- 
vices will be required very soon. The present campaign to  
promote production of wheat will certainly have similar 
consequences. 
2 .  Automobiles, trucks, motor-car accessories, and motors 
form the most important of all groups of American imports 
into this country. Brazil has only 160,000 motor-cars, just 
about as many as Japan, fewer than Belgium, Sweden, or 
New Zealand. It may be stated that  95 per cent are of 
American make. The Brazilian market, had we a greater 
purchasing power, should be the most important in the world 
on account of the size of the territory, the distances, and the 
lack of transportation facilities. It has accordingly been 
considered advisable by several American firms to  open in our 
principal centers assembly plants that today are supposed to  
supply 80 per cent of the total passenger-car sales. Then also 
we find since 1936 the competition of the cheap German 
motor-car. 
3. Aircraft and accessories have been supplied to  the 
Brazilian Army exclusively by the United States. But with 
the development of commercial and civil aviation, many 
competitors have entered the market : French, German, 
Italian, and British. Of course, European competition 
has been waved aside for the time being, but is still in 
the air. 
4. Coal has a dramatic story in Brazil: formerly it was a 
sort of privilege of Great Britain t o  supply us from Cardiff. 
The Great War shifted the mission of coal-supply to  the 
United States. Then Great Britain joined again, and from 
1930 onwards took the commanding lead she had lost. Sud- 
denly, Germany rose as a successful competitor, selling 
directly and indirectly through Holland. In  1937, the posi- 
tions were, respectively: 
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Germany: 711,000 tons 
Great Britain: 664,000 tons 
United States: 141,000 tons 
Of course American coal is always preferred by American- 
owned public utilities, but state-owned railways and other 
business organizations purchase German coal in order t o  free 
the blocked credits accumulated in Germany from the ex- 
ports of Brazilian products. Tha t  was the “compensating” 
system we could not avoid. 
5 .  The wheat and flour story is another page of past 
Brazilian-American transactions. For years and years, the 
largest imports were from the United States and special 
rates were granted by Brazil. Slowly but consistently, the 
Argentine entered the market, first in the southern states, as 
being closer than North America, then in the central states. 
Today the Argentine sells more wheat and flour, in tons, 
than coal is bought from England and the United States, 
940,000 tons in 1937. It was also here a question of lower 
prices, and with government measures to  stimulate domestic 
flour milling and wheat production in the southern states, 
there is little possibility that  the lost ground will ever be 
regained. 
6. Electric machinery and equipment form a group of 
supplies of great variety. An American lamp factory emi- 
grated t o  Brazil and further curtailed importations, till 
Japan came in with still cheaper lamps. Refrigerators, 
radios, and household appliances have had a large market 
opened by the installment system, very much used in Brazil. 
I n  many cases there is an assembly plant in the country that 
lowers the cost. Anyway, the income of the average middle- 
class family, though rapidly improving its standard of living, 
is still limited. 
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Air-conditioning apparatus, though used in some public 
buildings and picture-palaces, is not favorably accepted on 
the whole. The resistance is perhaps due to  very old habits of 
permanent apertures in houses, or t o  routine, or to  the high 
cost of an improvement not yet quite adequate. 
7. Iron and steel consumption is increasing rapidly, for 
Brazil is in her industrialization phase; but Germany was a 
powerful competitor. The  same could perhaps be said about 
chemicals and dyes. In  that  case, however, the competitors 
and American firms have opened branches in Brazil, and the 
emigration of industries has turned most of them into per- 
fectly acclimatized domestic industries, Palmolive, Barba- 
sol, Pond’s, etc. 
8. Machinery, road building, and rolling stock show once 
more how German methods of lower prices, compensation, 
and long terms of payment have been successful in over- 
coming the reputation and quality of American equipment. 
In  conclusion, it may be said that  the first phase of 
Brazilian-American relations is over: wheat flour, fruit, 
semi-manufactured products, and so on, are past. In the 
second phase, with the supply of other types of merchandise 
such as motor-cars, gasoline, iron, oils, electric equipment, 
films, and machines, these trade relations are still with- 
standing increasingly severe competition from industrialized 
European nations. The  German case is significant and full of 
useful lessons. 
Ralph Ackerman, commercial attach;, wrote advisedly in 
1937: “Whenever Brazilian exports to  Germany tend to ex- 
ceed purchases from Germany, the proceeds of the export 
surplus are accumulated in Germany in the form of blocked 
credits which can be used only for the purchase of German 
merchandise. As it is not to  the interest of the Brazilian 
Government to  maintain a large credit of this kind, there has 
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been a tendency for Government-controlled companies to  
divert their purchases to Germany in order t o  liquidate the 
out st an ding credits . ” 
Now that the postwar experiment is over, and we have a 
chance of rewriting the whole story, what is going to happen 
in the next chapter of Brazilian-American commerce? 
